PM Interviews Dan Czelusniak, USD(A&T)'s Director, Acquisition Program Integration

"Be Prepared to Compromise"

On August 22, 1997, DSMC Executive-in-Residence John Hickok spoke with Daniel P. Czelusniak, Director, Acquisition Program Integration, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (OUSD[A&T]). Appointed to the position of Director in October 1996, Czelusniak has now served one year in the extremely tough job of integrating all defense acquisition and technology planning, programming, and budgeting process activities. Simultaneously, he manages and directs the efficient functioning of the Department's formal weapons systems acquisition process and the application of its program performance management tools.

Unofficially labeled the USD(A&T)'s Chief of Staff, Czelusniak also oversees OUSD(A&T) congressional activities, including establishing coordinated Departmental positions on defense acquisition and technology issues.

With so many people, programs, policies, and other facets of the acquisition community clamoring for his attention at a time when the rules are changing daily, Czelusniak is a key player in the Department's efforts to institutionalize acquisition reform. In this interview, he talks about that role, program stability and the recent "Kaminski Initiative," Congress and the USD(A&T), and OUSD(A&T)'s automation initiatives. Of particular interest to program managers, he also gives us an insider's view into the PPBS process.

DANIEL P. CZELUSNIAK (LEFT), DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION PROGRAM INTEGRATION, OUSD(A&T), IS INTERVIEWED IN HIS PENTAGON OFFICE BY DSMC EXECUTIVE-IN-RESIDENCE JOHN HICKOK ON AUGUST 22, 1997.

Program Manager: *Some of our readers are probably wondering what the Director, Acquisition Program Integration does. The title is somewhat vague. Initially, it appears you're the man holding the purse strings, but that's wholly inadequate to describe the tremendous range of responsibilities you have. Could you give us a brief overview of the major areas you manage for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology)?*

Czelusniak: The Director is responsible for ensuring that the efforts of the OUSD(A&T) organization are integrated and directed toward achieving the objectives and responsibilities of the Under Secretary. That includes seven major areas of focus:

- developing defense acquisition policy and governing the operation of the defense acquisition process;
- promoting earned value management of defense programs, and measuring and assessing program performance;

Photos by Greg Caruth

- directing OUSD(A&T) action and participation in all phases of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System [PPBS] process, including long-range programmatic projections;

- managing OUSD(A&T) fiscal resources;

- guiding defense acquisition and technology congressional activities, including strategic planning, legislative proposal development, committee testimony, and reporting;

- managing OUSD(A&T) management information systems development and operation, and providing the automation infrastructure to meet OUSD(A&T) customer needs; and

- developing OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy governing contract advisory and assistance services, and managing the OSD studies program.

In addition to these stated responsibilities, the Director provides advice and counsel to the Under Secretary and Principal Deputy on cross-cutting issues demanding critical assessment and balanced perspective. It's a dynamic and challenging role. Luckily, I'm blessed with a completely dedicated and capable staff.

Program Manager: *Before leaving office, Dr. Kaminski said that achieving program stability was the most important piece of unfinished business left for acquisition reform. Recently, OSD took a major step in addressing the funding instability problem by instructing the Services to set aside money, beginning in fiscal year 2000, for financial reserve accounts designed to deal with technical risk in acquisition programs, something you've referred to as the Kaminski initiative. Since you're the "point man" on the fund, can you explain how it will work?*

Czelusniak: There are actually two separate aspects of the reserves that I should mention. The first deals with programming in the out years of the future year defense plan. The second deals with a pilot effort in the fiscal year 1999 budget.

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Beginning in fiscal year 2000, a programming reserve of $250 million will be established for cost growth stemming from technical risk in programs. The reserve will be stepped up each year in increments of $250 million so that by fiscal year 2003, the reserve will peak and remain at $1 billion per year, thereafter. Components will initially contribute to the establishment of the reserve based on their pro rata share of total annual investment levels. OSD will begin contributing in fiscal year 2002, and by 2003 will completely fund the reserve.

The lead year reserve will be liquidated in the budget as risks present themselves in the form of cost growth in programs. For example, the fiscal year 2000 reserve will be liquidated as part of the fiscal year 2000 budget build. The remaining out-year reserves will remain unencumbered. The Service Acquisition Executives will be responsible for management and liquidation of their portions of the reserve, subject to approval by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.

Again, the reserve is intended to offset cost growth attributable to technical problems. It is not intended to offset program funding reductions resulting from overall affordability decisions, like quantity changes and taxes for other Department bills, or to pay for new operational capability. Some examples of appropriate use of the reserve are labor rate changes, and test failure corrective actions or schedule slips due to underestimation of task difficulty for which the government is liable.

Because there was a lot of concern within the Department about our ability to sustain a reserve in the budget and execution years, due to congres-

sional prerogatives, liquidation was seen as the only immediately viable approach to achieving some measure of program stability. Clearly, to be wholly effective, we would want the reserve to be maintained into the execution year. So, in fiscal year 1999, we will attempt a pilot effort to gain congressional support for the concept of budgeting risk reserves in programs.

For this effort, the Military Departments will each select three programs to serve as pilots. Reserves will be explicitly identified in the President's budget at levels that do not expose large amounts of funding. The idea will be to select programs in which a relatively small reserve provides a high degree of leverage against technical risk and uncertainty that might arise in the execution year.

There is understandable trepidation associated with exposing resources as reserves. We've had preliminary discussions with senior congressional staff and the Office of Management and Budget regarding the reserve concept, and received generally favorable responses. The main concern expressed was the manner in which the reserves will be managed.

We've had a Joint OSD and Services working group developing those management mechanics. Follow-on discussions will be scheduled with the congressional staff to present the results of the group's effort and get a sense of support for the approach before the budget is finalized. In the meantime, we are proceeding on the assumption that we share a common objective of stabilizing program funding.[1]

Program Manager: *You were PEO for major Navy programs prior to becoming the Director, Acquisition Program Integration, so you've seen how the PPBS works from both perspectives.*

Knowing what you know now about the PPBS process, do you have any advice for program managers on how they can better prepare for the PPBS cycle?

Czelusniak: Recognize the realities of the process. It's critical for program managers to fully understand the mechanics, functional relationships, and competing objectives inherent in the PPBS. The large scope and rapidity of the process necessitate anticipating events and planning inputs accordingly.

Timeliness is critical since opportunities for input are calendar-driven, and once a decision is made it's virtually impossible to revisit the issue. Program managers need to become acquainted, and routinely interact, with the appropriate program and budget analysts within their own Service and OSD organizations to offset this limitation. PPBS is no less personality-driven than most complex processes that require human interaction.

The interaction must occur throughout the year, not just in the heat of budget reviews. Keeping key players in the loop as programs progress provides an opportunity to both ensure the program perspective is accurately characterized throughout the Department, and remain aware of differing perspectives. Lack of understanding and awareness are typical characteristics of the process when program managers don't have communicative relationships established with the programming and budgeting communities.

Sharing knowledge is imperative to establishing trust. Program managers who hoard information ostensibly to minimize their exposure to budgetary impacts, do a disservice to their programs. In the long run, a program manager's credibility wins more debates than impassioned arguments.

My final advice is, be prepared to compromise. The competing objectives inherent in the PPBS process guarantee that even when you have a persuasive argument, those other objectives may prevail. Be prepared to trade three pigs and a goat if necessary to get the horse. Having a strategy for compromise in advance can help you protect essential needs without risking the farm.

Program Manager: *Is there anything being done either to improve the PPBS or to help program managers in the process?*

Czelusniak: Before any process can be improved, it has to be understood by the parties trying to improve it. I don't dispute that the PPBS process could be improved, but we need to recognize what is wrong before changes are made. In this regard, my office has initiated an effort to examine development of a modeling and simulation tool to help identify what might be wrong with the PPBS and provide improved understanding (and thus help) to all participants in the process.

The approach is to provide meaningful, interactive training for both acquisition personnel in the intricacies and subtleties of the PPBS process (including congressional appropriations and budget execution processes), and PPBS practitioners in comprehending their impact on program execution. Through alternative role playing, participants can presumably gain insight into the procedures and interactions between the PPBS and acquisition processes, and most importantly, the motivations of the various players as they try either to produce a balanced defense budget, program for the huge diversity of future requirements, or advance their program.

Another, separate effort we have underway is to automate the process leading up to funding withhold or release decisions during the apportionment review. The current method of verifying the necessity of funding added by the Congress to various programs is time consuming and burdensome. The goal is to facilitate information sharing and processing to ensure adherence to the intent of the Congress while maintaining a suitable level of Departmental latitude to satisfy mandatory contin-

gency needs and minimize programmatic impacts.

Program Manager: *What is happening in the policy arena to streamline the acquisition process? How are the overarching integrated product teams working?*

Czelusniak: A lot has been done in the recent past to streamline the oversight and review process for defense acquisition programs. For example, the amount of mandatory policies and procedures has been reduced to about one-tenth of the former guidance. The sweeping policy and procedural changes of 1996 gave program managers much more flexibility and discretion in formulating acquisition strategies with tailored phases, milestones, and documentation.

Acquisition policy has also been consolidated for weapon systems and Automated Information Systems (AIS). The previously separate guidance caused program managers to have to sift through reams of information, and sort out for themselves the common and unique aspects of the applicable policy. The consolidation resulted in streamlined guidance, eliminated confusion, and improved understanding of the unique aspects of policy associated with the type of system.

One of our great success stories is the user-friendly *Defense Acquisition Deskbook* that contains not only DoD acquisition policies and procedures, but also Service-unique regulations and policies, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations, and special-interest items like the Year 2000 problem. The *Deskbook* is on the World Wide Web, and we distribute 20,000 copies on compact disk when new versions are released. It has enough material to fill two complete sets of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. More importantly, the information is easily accessible through a highly effective, interactive search capability. It is revolutionizing the way we learn and practice defense acquisition. The *Deskbook* Joint Program Office team deserves tons of credit for developing and maintaining this invaluable product.



"The sweeping policy and procedural changes of 1996 gave program managers much more flexibility and discretion in formulating acquisition strategies with tailored phases, milestones, and documentation."

We've created a standing Defense Acquisition Policy Working Group, made up of Service and OSD representatives, to keep acquisition policies current, and to continue to populate and renew the subjects covered in the *Deskbook*. The team meets biweekly and is currently working on changes to policy in the areas of the Information Technology Management Reform Act and Live-Fire Test and Evaluation. The team is also providing examples of how Cost As an Independent Variable has been successfully applied, and information on other transactions authority, and software engineering topics.

The single most important factor contributing to the success of our acquisition reform and streamlining efforts has been the use of integrated product teams. By involving key participants early and continuously, issues are surfaced sooner and resolved more quickly. A good example of the impact of integrated product teams is found in the functioning of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).

In 1996, after the application of integrated product teams, 16 DAB meetings were scheduled, but only three actually had to be held to get a decision. This year, we scheduled eight and needed only one. The reason truncation of the process was possible is that the integrated product teams resolved issues without a need to resort to the formality and associated administrative workload of a DAB meeting.

The most compelling evidence of the success of integrated product teams comes from our program teams themselves. In a survey of acquisition community personnel conducted this year, 77 percent reported that the use of integrated product teams resulted in an improved acquisition process with better products than the hierarchical management approach of the past. This was up from 70 percent in a simi-

lar survey last year. Clearly, the concept is here to stay as we all begin to recognize and embrace the benefits of teamwork and empowerment.

Program Manager: *Since you have responsibility for OUSD(A&T) congressional activities, can you comment on any initiatives being undertaken with respect to the Congress on acquisition and technology issues?*

Czelusniak: One of our most important responsibilities is to ensure we have a coherent explanation and justification for our acquisition and technology program each year as Congress reviews the president's budget during the annual authorization and appropriation processes. Congressional testimony is of course a big part of telling that story. This past year, OUSD(A&T) officials, from the Under Secretary on down, testified on the Hill on numerous programs and initiatives, including acquisition reform, modernization of tactical air forces, ballistic missile defense, acquisition workforce, consolidation of the defense industry, and logistics reform.

In addition to coordinating testimony before congressional committees, we meet with key members and staff throughout the year to discuss important acquisition and technology issues. We are also working on systemic improvements in how we relate to Congress. These improvements focus on legislative proposals and communications.

Each year, the Department submits a program of legislative proposals to the Congress to amend or repeal existing statutes, or write new statutes, to improve defense acquisition and technology. To enhance the quality of our acquisition and technology legislative program, we recently established an improved process for developing proposals. This new process has two main elements.

The first is a strong emphasis on teamwork. Too often in the past, the acquisition and technology community at large, including OSD and the Services, has not come together on issues of common interest to formulate integrated legislative solutions. The result has sometimes been a set of overlapping or even contradictory proposals. Needless to say, such proposals do not stand a good chance of success on the Hill.

The second element is early coordination. When Congress convenes in January, we need to be ready with a fully coordinated, integrated package. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case. To remedy that, we have already begun coordination for the fiscal year 1999 legislative program. We are optimistic that early and full coordination will resolve contentious issues and galvanize the entire community around a strong set of proposals.

The other initiative I'd like to mention is related to external communications. We are engaged in a new strategic planning effort, which includes the Services, to enhance how we communicate our acquisition and technology goals in order to effect desired outcomes. Since Congress is a major component of our external environment, this planning necessarily includes the Hill, but it is really being pursued as a much broader effort, targeting all elements of our external environment, including Congress, the defense industry, other federal agencies, international allies, and the public.

The Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology presides over a vast collection of activities, everything from developing a new Joint Strike Fighter to improving military housing. With such an extensive breadth of responsibility, it's easy to default to a reactive mode as issues bubble-up to the surface. Our strategic planning initiative is aimed at becoming more proactive in shaping the environment to facilitate achievement of key acquisition and technology objectives.

Program Manager: *Secretary Cohen recently released his Acquisition Year 2000 Goals. One of those goals was to "create a world-class learning organization by offering 40 or more hours annually of continuing education and training to the DoD acquisition workforce." Your office has already sponsored a marvelous example of technology-based education in the Acquisition Deskbook. Thanks to your staff we also have the ACQWeb site, which is already proving its worth as another fine information resource for our acquisition workforce. What other automation initiatives are you working on that will have a beneficial impact on acquisition education?*

Czelusniak: First, let me say that we have a responsibility in Acquisition Program Integration to help support the formal training programs being developed by the Defense Acquisition University and its consortium schools. We plan to accomplish this by working toward three goals:

- fostering increased use of computers and the World Wide Web within the acquisition community to provide access to timely and relevant information and training;
- working with the Services to develop and support funding strategies that will ensure a coordinated, community-wide modernization of the computer and network infrastructure that supports our acquisition workforce; and
- providing technical guidance and leadership on standardizing the information management tools used within the acquisition community.

During the coming year, we will be sponsoring three major information management initiatives that will impact a large segment of the acquisition community. These initiatives include –

- enhancing *ACQ*Web, which is the current OUSD(A&T) Home Page on the World Wide Web, to allow users to participate in moderated

"chat" sessions with key acquisition officials and routinely access (download) audio and video-enabled files on key acquisition topics;

- implementing an OUSD(A&T) Intranet that will use web-browser technology to allow our acquisition workforce to access sensitive but unclassified information that is not available on the publicly accessible *ACQ*Web; and

- implementing desktop conferencing capabilities that will support distance collaboration and learning via the Internet.

Each of these initiatives builds upon the growing popularity of the Internet as a medium for learning. Thus, it is vitally important that all members of the acquisition workforce have access to robust desktop computers and reliable, high-speed communication links to the Internet. That is why I am committed to working with the Services on developing a coordinated funding strategy to deal with the issue of infrastructure modernization and desktop upgrades.

I would like to focus for a moment on our initiative to develop desktop conferencing capabilities. We believe this initiative has the most potential to revolutionize the way we collaborate and learn. In a nutshell, we want to provide a means for people in the acquisition community to interact with each other via the Internet on a real-time basis, using both audio and full-motion video capabilities. This would allow us to conduct electronic meetings, training sessions, and virtual integrated product team sessions.

The technology to pursue this initiative is rapidly maturing in the commercial sector. It is essential that we address this capability from an enterprise perspective, to avoid the proliferation of non-standard solutions that will result in stovepipes within the acquisition community. To that end, I have proposed the establishment of a Joint OSD and Services working group

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to plan for this capability and to oversee implementation efforts.

Program Manager: *Now that you've been in this job for nearly a year, what do you see as needing emphasis in the area of program performance management?*

Czelusniak: There are three things that are getting our primary attention in this area. First, the application of earned value as a management tool versus a reporting requirement needs continuing emphasis. Second, the transformation of the Defense Acquisition Executive Reporting Summary (DAES) reporting process, from a "one-way" to a "two-way" customer orientation, needs to occur. Finally, we need to develop an ability to identify and manage total ownership costs in order to optimize decision making.

Earned value began as a good idea 30 years ago but did not reach its full potential until recently because it was heretofore applied mainly as a government reporting requirement, not as a management tool. In its contemporary application, earned value management [EVM] has become a powerful mechanism for effectively integrating cost, schedule, and technical performance measurement. As such, it has become an effective risk management tool for program managers.

The key to converting earned value from a reporting burden to a management enhancement is the conduct of integrated baseline reviews [IBR]. These are reviews conducted soon after contract award, or even before in a sole-source environment, to ensure the supplier and customer have mutual understanding of contract scope, schedule, and resources, with emphasis on items expected to be high-cost or -risk. Unlike the former cost and schedule control system criteria [C/SCSC] reviews, IBRs are led by program managers and their integrated product teams. The object is to ensure an integrated plan is in place before work begins and the entire team understands how performance will be

managed and where risks lie in the program. By placing earned value information in the hands of the performing integrated product teams, we have virtually eliminated the audit-like C/SCSC reviews of the past.

A good indication of the utility of EVM is reflected by its increasing voluntary adoption by industry, including commercial applications. This trend lends itself to the single process initiative and contributes to reduced government oversight. We also have ample evidence to document the utility of EVM on defense programs. The Air Force JPATS, Army PAC-3, and Navy F/A-18E/F programs are all excellent examples of successful management using earned value.[2]

The DAES is the quarterly report prepared by ACAT I program managers to address program execution status against an Acquisition Program Baseline for cost, schedule, and performance goals, and potential problems (early warning). In the past, the process of DAES preparation and review had what I would characterize as a "one-way" customer orientation. By that, I mean the process only had value to the OSD staff and leadership as a report card on program performance. It had virtually no value to program managers as customers looking for resolution of problems identified in the DAES reports.

We are now on a course of transforming the DAES process to be "two-way" customer-oriented. We want to make the process a problem-resolution mechanism for program managers, as well as a status reporting device for OSD. For example, last November we started collecting information regarding funding-related problems from the DAES reports. The information was typically associated with future problems that would result if current funding actions or shortfalls were permitted to persist.

This is information program managers have been reporting all along. The problem is, we haven't acted on the information to assist program managers in a solution. We are now using that information to categorize and help solve specific problems, as well as track systemic trends so future problems can be avoided. The results have been gratifying. The DAES process is being transformed to recognize program managers as customers who deserve service when they identify a need to upper management.

The last area of program performance management I want to mention deals with total ownership cost. That is, the sum of all financial resources necessary to organize, equip, operate, and sustain military forces. It's often referred to as life-cycle cost in the context of an individual system.

At the April 1997 PEO/SysCom Commanders/PM Conference, the Military Departments' senior logistics officers unanimously reaffirmed the lack of a robust cost accounting system as the single greatest impediment to controlling and managing life-cycle costs. Planning meetings were subsequently conducted to address issues relating to the control of life-cycle costs. As a result, the Secretary of Defense established a DoD Acquisition Year 2000 Goal to "define requirements and establish an implementation plan for a cost accounting system that provides routine visibility into weapon system life-cycle costs through activity-based costing and management."

We have taken the lead in Acquisition Program Integration to establish, organize, and support a multi-discipline team that will coordinate the identification of customers and total ownership cost requirements, develop near- and long-term implementation plans, and guide implementation. This will involve near-term assessment of the capability of current, activity-based costing (ABC) and other systems, like VAMOSC, to satisfy total ownership cost requirements. The effort will lead to identification and evaluation of potential pilot ABC programs, and development of an implementation plan for a comprehensive total ownership cost accounting system.

Program Manager: *We understand that government sponsorship of the Software Engineering Institute [SEI] was recently transferred from DARPA to OUSD(A&T). What is the significance of that move with respect to program managers and their responsibility for the acquisition of software-intensive systems?*

Czelusniak: The SEI is a DoD Federally Funded Research and Development Center that was created in 1984. Its focus is on the transition of new and improved software engineering practices and technology to enhance the ability to build, acquire, and refresh software-intensive systems. The transfer of sponsorship from DARPA to OUSD(A&T) signals a recognition that the SEI's technology transition initiatives offer direct benefits to every program manager concerned with delivering and supporting high-quality, cost-effective, software-intensive systems.

As part of the transition of sponsorship, we conducted a review of the SEI's program of work. The review team was comprised of senior acquisition officials from the OSD and Services familiar with software engineering issues and problems. On the positive side, the review team stated strong support for many of the ongoing initiatives at the SEI, and for many of the products and tools being produced. However, on the negative side, a common observation was, "Gee, I wish I knew about these products before now."

As a result, a major initiative to get the word out on the SEI and its capabilities, with respect to program managers' needs, is now underway. I encourage program managers to investigate how SEI can help them with their software challenges. Likewise, program managers can help us by identifying contemporary problems needing the attention of this premier center of software expertise.[3]

Program Manager: *Tell us about your management style and future direction for*

the Office of Acquisition Program Integration.

Czelusniak: I'd like to think I'm adaptive to different situations and people. I don't believe a single management style works well in all circumstances. However, there are some constants for me. I'm a great believer in the power of teamwork, delegation of authority, and trusting people to do their jobs when you've told them your expectations, defined the boundaries they can work freely within, and equipped them with appropriate training and tools needed to perform.

The Acquisition Program Integration organization has a critical role to play in developing coherent positions on controversial, cross-cutting issues of acquisition and technology for the Under Secretary and OSD principals. We are fulfilling that role. In the future, I think we also have a role to perform in facilitating the work of DoD program managers.

Many of the initiatives I discussed earlier have that orientation and emphasis. We need to recognize program managers as customers of the policies, procedures, and products we develop in OSD, as opposed to viewing them as compliance agents. Acquisition Program Integration is uniquely positioned and committed to providing that kind of customer service in the future.

ENDNOTES

1. For more information on "Program Stability, The Kaminski Initiative," refer to *Program Manager*, September-October 1997 issue, p. 59.

2. For more information on "Earned Value Management," refer to *Program Manager*, January-February 1997 issue, p. 58, or visit the EVM Website at **http://www.acq.osd.mil/pm**.

3. For more information on the SEI, visit their Website at **http://www.sei.cmu.edu_.**

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Daniel P. Czelusniak is the Director, Acquisition Program Integration, reporting directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. In this capacity, he is responsible for the integration of all defense acquisition and technology planning, programming, and budgeting process activities, as well as directing the efficient functioning of the Department's formal weapons systems acquisition process.

A native of Chicopee, Mass., Czelusniak received his B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Northeastern University in 1968. In 1971, he joined the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and completed the engineer/scientist development program in 1971.

From 1971 to 1977, he held a variety of project engineering positions supporting Naval helicopter and fighter aircraft propulsion system programs. In 1973, Czelusniak earned his M.B.A from The George Washington University.

From 1977 to 1983, Czelusniak served as Technical Director, and later as Assistant Division Director, Aviation Support Equipment Division, NAVAIR. In 1983, he earned a Navy Executive Management Fellowship and was awarded his M.P.A. from Harvard University one year later. Upon his return from Harvard, he was assigned as Deputy Program Manager for the LAMPS MK III and H-60 Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) helicopter programs, and served in that capacity until November 1987.

Subsequently, he assumed responsibility as Program Director, Air Launched Weapons and Armament Programs. His portfolio included all air-to-air missiles, aerial targets, anti-ship missiles, and strike weapons. In April 1990, Czelusniak was appointed Deputy Program Executive Officer and later Program Executive Officer for Air ASW, Assault and Special Mission programs, reporting to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. In this capacity, he was responsible for executive management of all Navy and Marine Corps anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare, strategic communications, training, executive transport, and amphibious assault aircraft programs.

Following a brief tour as the Deputy Director of Navy International Programs, in October 1996 he assumed his current position.

Czelusniak has been a member of the Senior Executive Service since 1987. He is a graduate of the NAVAIR Senior Executive Management Development Program, a member of the Pi Tau Sigma National Honor Fraternity of Mechanical Engineers, and a designated Civilian Materiel Professional. His many awards include the Presidential Rank Award of Meritorious Executive, the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, and the Navy Distinguished Civilian Service Medal.